
























Is the EITC as Good as an NIT? 




Jesse Rothstein, Princeton University 
 














Acknowledgements:  I am grateful to David Card, Nada Eissa, Hank Farber, Jonah Gelbach, 
Hilary Hoynes, and Austin Nichols for helpful discussions, and the Princeton Industrial Relations 
Section and Center for Economic Policy Studies for financial support. Abstract
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is intended to encourage work. But EITC-induced
increases in labor supply may drive wages down, shifting the intended transfer toward
employers. I simulate the economic incidence of the EITC under a range of plausible
supply and demand elasticities. In all of the scenarios that I consider, a substantial
portion of the intended transfer to low income single mothers is captured by employers
through reduced wages. The transfer to employers is borne in part by low skill workers
who are not themselves eligible for the EITC and are therefore made strictly worse oﬀ by
its existence. I contrast the EITC with a traditional Negative Income Tax (NIT). The
NIT discourages work, and so induces large transfers from employers of low skill labor to
their workers. With my preferred parameters the EITC increases after-tax incomes by
$0.73 per dollar spent, while the NIT yields $1.39.1 Introduction
Most means-tested transfer programs impose high eﬀective tax rates on earned income.
In recent decades, however, there has been a trend toward the imposition of labor supply
conditions for the receipt of beneﬁts. In the United States, traditional welfare was replaced
with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), which comes with time limits and
work requirements, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) was repeatedly expanded.
By 2000, spending on the EITC was 70% larger than that on TANF (Hotz and Scholz,
2003).
The EITC is often seen as an implementation of a Negative Income Tax, or NIT, but its
central feature distinguishes it. Where non-workers receive the largest payments under the
NIT, only families with earned income can receive the EITC. This feature ensures that
the EITC encourages rather than discourages labor force participation among eligible
individuals.1
Saez (2002b) argues that the optimal income transfer program will resemble the EITC
if labor supply decisions are made primarily on the extensive (participation) margin,
whereas intensive (hours) responses lead to an optimal tax that more closely resembles
the NIT. Given mounting evidence that labor market participation is far more elastic
with respect to the wage than are hours among participants, Saez’s analysis supports the
view (also advanced by Triest, 1994; Liebman, 2002; Eissa et al., 2008; and Blundell and
Shephard, 2008) that the shape of the EITC schedule is a desirable one.
But Saez’s analysis, like nearly all optimal tax analyses and discussions of the EITC,
presumes that the incidence of taxes is entirely on workers. As Fullerton and Metcalf
(2002) note, “this assumption has never been tested” (p. 29).2 A basic result in the
economics of taxation is that the economic incidence of taxes depends on the elasticities
of supply and demand for the good being taxed and not on their statutory incidence. If
demand is less than perfectly elastic, supply-side taxes are partially passed through to the
demand side via changes in the equilibrium price. Eﬀects on prices are are of the opposite
sign as those on supply, so any program that increases labor supply will lead to reduced
pre-tax wages. This implies that employers of low-skill labor capture a portion of the
intended EITC transfer. Moreover, because EITC recipients (primarily single mothers)
1This is clearly true only for unmarried recipients. I discuss the incentives faced by secondary earners
as well as the intensive margin incentives below.
2Anderson and Meyer (1997, 2000); Bingley and Lanot (2002); Gruber (1994, 1997), and Kubik (2004)
estimate tax incidence, generally ﬁnding that workers bear much but not all of the burden. Lise et al.’s
(2004) examination of the Canadian Self Suﬃciency Project (SSP) is the only evaluation of an income
transfer program of which I am aware that considers general equilibrium eﬀects. These eﬀects reverse
the conclusion of a partial equilibrium cost-beneﬁt analysis.
1compete in the same labor markets as others who are ineligible for the credit, wage declines
extend to many workers who do not receive oﬀsetting EITC payments. These unintended
transfers limit the EITC’s value as a tool for income redistribution. Recognizing the
endogeneity of wages thus reduces the attractiveness of work-encouraging transfers like
the EITC. But the practical importance of incidence eﬀects is unclear.
In this paper, I show that incidence eﬀects are extremely important to the evalua-
tion of the EITC. With plausible labor supply and demand elasticities, the unintended
consequences of the EITC operating through the wage are large relative to the direct,
intended transfers. Neglecting these wage eﬀects leads to quite misleading assessments of
the impact of a hypothetical EITC expansion on labor supply, incomes, and welfare.
I begin by extending the standard partial equilibrium tax incidence model to take
account of important complexities in the labor market: Tax schedules are non-linear and
heterogeneous across workers; the good being supplied is diﬀerentiated and imperfectly
substitutable; and supply choices combine discrete (participate or not?) and continuous
(how many hours to work?) decisions. I show that targeted work subsidies produce
unintended transfers to employers, coming not just from targeted workers but also from
ineligible workers in the same labor markets. The transfer to employers is largest when
the subsidy induces large increases in labor supply and when demand is inelastic; it is
paid primarily by targeted workers only when targeted and ineligible workers are poor
substitutes in production.
I derive formulas for tax incidence that depend on the labor supply elasticity measures
that are commonly obtained in empirical work: the elasticity of labor force participation
with respect to the average tax rate on workers’ earnings and the (uncompensated) elas-
ticity of hours worked, conditional on participation, with respect to the marginal tax rate.
Although both average and marginal tax rates vary substantially across even similarly-
skilled workers, I show that incidence calculations can proceed based on aggregate data
with only the mean rates within appropriately-deﬁned cells.
To evaluate the importance of incidence considerations, I contrast two alternative
income transfer policies: a small EITC expansion and a comparably-sized NIT, both
targeted at families with children. Using data from the 1993 March Current Population
Survey, I simulate the impact on the female labor market of adding each program to the
actual 1992 tax schedule. I examine the eﬀects of each program on labor supply, earnings,
and net transfers, both for all women and for women disaggregated by EITC eligibility
(i.e., the presence of children), marital status, and skill.
I treat elasticities and other parameters as known.3 While I consider a range of
3A companion paper (Rothstein, 2008) uses an actual EITC expansion to estimate the elasticities of
2plausible values, I focus on cases in which labor supply is more elastic at the extensive
margin than at the intensive margin. In this case, with ﬁxed wages the EITC causes net
increases in low-skilled women’s labor supply, while the NIT reduces supply. Thus, Saez
(2002b) concludes that the optimal schedule resembles the EITC.
The evaluation of the two programs is quite diﬀerent when incidence is taken into
account, as the EITC produces large unintended transfers that oﬀset many of its beneﬁts.
With my preferred parameters, a dollar of EITC spending produces net transfers to women
with children of only $0.83. Another $0.36 is transferred to employers of low-skill labor,
with the excess $0.18 coming from (ineligible) childless women. The passthrough from
single mothers, the primary group targeted by the EITC, is even larger: Fully 55% of
the marginal EITC dollar given to this group is transferred to employers through reduced
wages, and single childless women lose almost exactly as much as single mothers gain.
One might evaluate the EITC by its impact on recipients’ after-tax incomes rather
than on their welfare.4 The EITC is more attractive by this measure: The net-of-tax
incomes of women with children rise by $1.07 for each dollar spent on the program.
However, this is much smaller than the $1.39 that one would have computed with ﬁxed
wages. Moreover, it is accompanied by a decline of $0.34 in the net-of-tax incomes of
women without children, who respond to falling wages by reducing labor supply.
The contrast with the NIT is dramatic. The NIT imposes positive tax rates on earn-
ings, leading to net reductions in labor supply among eligible women and thereby to
increased wages. A dollar transferred to families with earned income through the NIT
produces a total transfer of $2.77 and an increase in after-tax income of $2.49, both far
in excess of the budgetary cost of $1.79. Transfers ﬂow from employers to their workers,
and even ineligible workers’ welfares and incomes rise.
There are several limitations to my analysis. First, I ignore the taxes that would
be needed to ﬁnance the proposed EITC and NIT programs. These would presumably
be levied on higher-income taxpayers, though their incidence too is unclear. Second, I
examine only the ﬁrst-order eﬀects of tax policy on wages, not second- and third-order
eﬀects on other prices. The analysis is thus not fully general equilibrium. Third, I neglect
many of the complexities introduced by nonlinear income tax schedules. I implicitly
assume that small tax changes will not lead workers to jump from one segment of the
tax schedule to another. This is unrealistic, but is necessary to obtain simple expressions
for incidence eﬀects and is unlikely to substantially aﬀect the results. Finally, I do not
labor supply and demand that are needed for incidence calculations. The results of that paper inform
the choice of elasticity values here.
4In the words of Besley and Coate (1995), “[t]here is little evidence that the poor’s leisure is valued
by policy makers.” See also Besley and Coate (1992) and Moﬃtt (2006).
3extend the analysis to derive the implications for the optimal tax schedule. At a minimum,
however, my simulation results suggest caution in deriving policy conclusions from models
with ﬁxed wages. Allowing for plausible labor demand elasticities leads to substantial
changes in the distribution of outcomes.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I develop the theoretical framework. The
EITC program is described in Section 3. I also review there the evidence on the EITC’s
labor supply eﬀects. Section 4 describes the data and tax simulation. Section 5 introduces
the EITC and NIT policy alternatives. Section 6 describes the details of the simulation.
Section 7 presents results. Section 8 concludes.
2 A Model of Tax Incidence
In this section, I develop a model of partial equilibrium tax incidence that is suitable to
the complexities of the labor market. I begin with a simple textbook presentation, then
gradually extend it to allow for heterogeneity across workers, non-proportional taxes, and
distinct participation and hours choices.
2.1 The Textbook Model
I begin with constant-elasticity supply and demand functions for a homogenous good,
with taxes levied on the supplier:
(1) L
S (w) = α(w(1 − τ))
σ and L
D (w) = βw
−ρ.
Here, w is the price faced by the demander, w (1 − τ) is the net-of-tax price received by
the supplier, and σ and ρ are the price elasticities of supply and demand, respectively.
The equilibrium pre-tax price and quantity are
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σ+ρdτ–and the supply side bears the remaining
ρ
σ+ρ share. The











. It is smaller than the statutory tax whenever
supply is at all elastic (σ > 0) and demand is less than perfectly elastic (ρ < ∞); it is
smallest when supply is highly elastic and demand highly inelastic.
42.2 Incidence with heterogeneous workers
Workers of diﬀerent skills are not perfectly substitutable in production, and even workers
of the same skill may face diﬀerent tax rates. The textbook model can be extended to allow
for distinct labor markets and for tax rates that diﬀer both across and within markets.
For the moment, I maintain the assumption that taxes are proportional to earnings and
that labor supply is characterized by a single parameter, σ. The supply of individual i
working in market s is
Lis = αi (ws (1 − τis))
σ . (3)
This expression allows tax rates to vary freely across individuals, but assumes that the
pre-tax wage is constant across workers in the same market. The total labor supplied to
market s is Ls =
P















Using (3) and again approximating dln(1 − τis) ≈ −dτis, this yields









= σ(dlnws − dτs),
where dτs ≡ L−1
s
P
i Lisdτis. Thus, aggregate labor supplied to market s depends on the
wage in that market and on the weighted mean tax rate in the market, using individuals’
baseline labor supplies as weights.
Next, I need to model the determination of wages. I assume that workers within each
market are perfect substitutes and that total eﬀective labor supply is a Constant Elasticity












Here, ρ is the elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent types of labor. Cost minimization
implies a set of labor demand functions of the form:





where ψ = ψ(w1, w2, ..., wS) is a parameter reﬂecting the aggregate demand for labor.
5Note that wt enters the expression for Ls, s 6= t, only through ψ. Because I focus on
partial equilibrium incidence and not on changes in the price level, I neglect eﬀects of
taxes operating through ψ.
Diﬀerentiating the inverse demand implied by (7) yields
dlnws = dlnβs + ρ
−1dlnψ − ρ
−1dlnLs. (8)





















As the mean tax rate in the labor market rises, supply falls and wages increase. Just as
in the textbook model, the employer’s share of the change in average taxes is σ
σ+ρ.
2.3 Implications for Subgroup Analyses
It can also be of interest to examine the distribution of impacts across deﬁned subgroups
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Thus, labor supply of subgroup g is declining in the mean tax rate in that subgroup but,
conditional on this, increasing in the mean across the entire labor market.
Studies of the eﬀects of tax reforms on labor supply frequently exploit contrasts be-
tween workers who plausibly participate in the same labor markets but are diﬀerently
aﬀected by a change in the tax regime (see, e.g., Eissa, 1995; Eissa and Hoynes, 2006b,
2004; Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). These can identify the
supply elasticity without accounting for wage eﬀects. To see this, simply diﬀerence (10)
between subgroups g1 and g2:
dlnLsg1 − dlnLsg2 = −σ (dτsg1 − dτsg2).
Frequently, group g2 is not directly aﬀected by the tax change (i.e. dτsg2 = 0). For
example, in studies of the EITC’s eﬀect on labor supply, women without children – who
are not eligible for the EITC – are often used as a “control” group. This terminology
6makes it seem as if the eﬀect on the “treatment” group’s labor supply is σdτsg1. This
would be correct if wages were ﬁxed. But with general equilibrium eﬀects this can be
quite misleading. By (10), the net eﬀect on group g1’s labor supply (neglecting changes










This can be quite diﬀerent from the partial equilibrium labor supply eﬀect if the taxed
group is a large share of labor market s. Moreover, the “control” group g2’s supply changes
as well, by σ2
σ+ρ
Lsg1
Ls dτsg1. By (9a), if dτsg1 > 0 (< 0) both groups will see declining (rising)
wages.
Now imagine varying groups’ shares of the labor market, Lsg1/Ls, holding dτs = (Lsg1/Ls)dτsg1
constant. That is, we compare a large tax cut targeted to a small group with a smaller cut
spread across a larger group. The eﬀects on employers and on group g2’s labor supply will
be the same in either case, but the distribution of transfers will not. If group g1 comprises
the full labor market (i.e., Lsg1 = Ls), the full transfer to/from employers comes from this
group, whose wages fall by
σ
σ+ρdτsg1. As the targeted group’s share of the skill-s labor
market falls, however, group g2 bears an increasing share of the transfer to employers.
2.4 Nonlinear tax schedules
Finally, I extend the model to a nonlinear tax schedule. Let the tax paid by individual i, be
an arbitrary function of individual earnings yi ≡ Liwi, non-labor income Ri (assumed to
be exogenous), and demographic characteristics Xi: Ti = T (yi, Ri, Xi). The individual’s
labor supply decision will depend on the marginal tax rate on earnings, MTRi ≡ ∂T/∂yi,
and, potentially, on other aspects of the tax schedule. For example, a discrete choice be-
tween working zero hours, which provides after-tax income Ri−T (0, Ri, Xi), and working
h > 0 hours for after-tax income Ri +hwi −T (hwi, Ri, Xi)) presumably depends on the
average tax rate over the 0 to h range, ATRi ≡ (hwi)
−1 [T (hwi, Ri, Xi) − T (0, Ri, Xi)].
It is straightforward to extend the incidence model to the nonlinear tax case so long
as dlnLsg is linear in dlnws and a set of tax parameters {dτsg1, ..., dτsgk}. Assume
(11) dlnLsg = σwdlnws − σ1dτsg1 − ··· − σkdτsgk
and labor demand is as in (7). By (8), the impact of a tax shock on wages is proportional














As before, the tax rates in (11) and (12) are the hours-weighted averages across workers
in market s.
Empirical researchers often estimate the eﬀects of tax changes on labor force partic-
ipation and on average hours among participants. The current framework can be used
to incorporate these extensive and intensive responses. I neglect income eﬀects here; the
system is extended to include them in the appendix. Let psg be the participation rate
of group g in market s and let hsg represent average hours among participants. Total
labor supply in the group is therefore Lsg = Nsgpsghsg, where Nsg is the number of in-
dividuals in the group. Let σe and σi be the extensive- and intensive-margin elasticities,
respectively. Letting dMTRsg and dATRsg be the change in mean marginal and aver-
age tax rates in the subgroup (as before, weighted by hours worked), this means that
dlnhsg = σi (dlnws − dMTRsg) and
dlnpsg = σedln(hsgws (1 − ATRsg))
≈ σe (1 + σi)dlnws − σeσidMTRsg − σedATRsg.
The overall change in labor supply in response to a tax change is thus
(13)
dlnLsg = dlnpsg + dlnhsg = (σi + σe + σiσe)dlnws − σi (1 + σe)dMTRsg − σedATRsg
and the reduced-form eﬀect of the tax change on wages is
(14) dlnws =
1
σi + σe + σiσe + ρ
[dlnψ + (σi + σiσe)dMTRs + σedATRs].
Several aspects of these equations are of note. First, note that the product of the
intensive- and extensive-margin elasticities appears in several places. This reﬂects the
fact that any change in hourly after-tax wages leads to an intensive-margin response, and
that this in turn changes the incentive to participate. Second, all of the tax rates are
hours-weighted averages among workers in the cell; the implicit assumption is that the
change in ATRs and MTRs faced by working women in an s−g cell captures the change
in the labor supply incentives faced by non-workers. This is questionable at best, but
may be a tolerable approximation. Third, if σe = 0, (13) and (14) reduce to the simpler
8expressions in Section 2.2, using only σi and the marginal tax rate. Similarly, if σi = 0, we
obtain the same expressions from Section 2.2, this time using σe and the average tax rate.
Fourth, the same simpliﬁcation does not arise when only one of the tax rates is changed
but both elasticities are non-zero: A change in either tax rate inﬂuences both extensive-
and intensive-margin labor supply decisions via its eﬀect on wages. Finally, wage eﬀects
of tax changes are proportional to their impacts on labor supply. As discussed below, the
EITC has opposite eﬀects on MTRs and ATRs for many women. The net impact on the
wage will depend on the sum of extensive- or intensive-margin labor supply responses.
2.5 Continuous skill distributions
The above model assumes that each worker participates in one of S distinct labor markets,
and that an increase in labor supply in one of these markets has the same proportional
eﬀect on wages in every other market. In analyses of labor supply responses that do not
examine wage eﬀects, it is conventional to deﬁne labor markets by observed education and
experience. This is less attractive for demand analyses: In the CES production function
used here, a shock to the labor supply of young high school dropouts must have the same
proportional eﬀects on the wages of young high school graduates as on those of older
college graduates.
An alternative is to treat skill as a continuous variable. Teulings (1995, 2005) develops
a model of job assignments when “close” skill types are more substitutable than are those
further apart in the distribution. In his model, the relevant labor supply that determines
the wages of a worker with skill s (in, e.g., the inverse version of (7)) is the local average
around s, with more weight on skill levels closer to s. Moreover, in any cross section there
is a one-to-one mapping from wages to skills. Thus, we can continue to use the above
reduced-form equations for taxes and labor supply by simply re-deﬁning the market-level
tax shock that is relevant to worker i as the local average of the change in tax rates among
workers with wages close to wi:
dτs(i) ≡
P
j LjK (ω−1d(wi, wj))dτj
P
j LjK (ω−1d(wi, wj))
.
Here, d(w0, w1) representes the distance from w0 to w1 in some suitable metric, K () is a
kernel function, and ω is a bandwidth. As before, this local average is weighted by labor
supply.
My main estimates use the conventional education-experience categorization. I also
present estimates from the continuous skill model – with d(wi, wj) ≡ |lnwi − lnwj|, the
9Table 1: The EITC Schedule
If y is between the credit is the marginal tax rate is
0 and C/τ1 τ1y −τ1
C/τ1 and p C 0
p and p + C/τ2 C − τ2 (y − p) τ2
p + C/τ2 0 0
Epanechnikov kernel, and a bandwidth of 0.1 – as a speciﬁcation check. Rothstein (2008)
explores this model more fully.
3 An Overview of the EITC
The EITC is a refundable tax credit that depends on a family’s total earnings according
to a four-segment schedule.5 Four parameters deﬁne the credit: A phase-in rate τ1, a
maximum credit C, an income level p at which the credit begins to phase out, and a
phase-out rate τ2. Table 1 describes the credit and marginal tax rate for a family with
earned income y, depending on the range in which y falls.6
All four parameters vary across family types and over time. In 1992, families without
children were ineligible, and families with more than one child were slightly more gener-
ously treated (higher C, τ1, and τ2) than families with just one. Importantly, the schedule
did not (until 2002) vary with the number of adults or the number of workers in the
household. Figure 1 displays the 1992 EITC schedule. Eissa and Hoynes (2008) review
the EITC’s dramatic expansion from its introduction in 1975 to the present. This has gen-
erally come through increases in the four parameters (though not always in proportion)
rather than through changes in the fundamental structure of the program.
Liebman (1998) and Hotz and Scholz (2003) discuss the EITC’s labor supply incen-
tives. In the phase-in range, marginal tax rates (MTRs) are negative and substitution
eﬀects should lead to increased labor supply, but income eﬀects may partially oﬀset this.
In the plateau region, MTRs are zero and income eﬀects are negative. In the phase-out,
substitution and income eﬀects reinforce each other, both leading to reductions in labor
supply. Thus, traditional labor supply models with continuous hours choices suggest a
net negative labor supply eﬀect.
But the annual hours distribution is extremely concentrated: 74% of women who work
5EITC take-up rates are estimated at 80% or more (Scholz, 1994; Kopczuk and Pop-Eleches, 2007).
6If Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) – typically just the sum of earnings and non-labor income – is above
p, the credit can be less than is shown in Table 1 and Figure 1, and if AGI is above p + C/τ2 the family
receives no EITC.
10at all in a year work at least 48 weeks, and 52% work between 38 and 42 hours per week.7
If the participation decision is discrete, average tax rates (ATRs) on a woman’s potential
earnings may be more important than MTRs. The EITC produces negative ATRs for all
primary earners with potential earnings below p+C/τ2, so should have induced increased
participation from single parents. Among secondary earners, by contrast, nearly all of the
incentives are toward reduced labor supply on both the extensive and intensive margins
(Eissa and Hoynes, 2004). 8
The empirical literature on labor supply is huge. Hausman (1985), Pencavel (1986),
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), and Moﬃtt (2002) provide reviews. Three frequent ﬁnd-
ings are that men’s labor supply is quite unresponsive to changes in the wage or in
non-labor income; that women’s labor supply is more elastic; and that low-skill workers’
supply is more elastic than that of high-skill workers. As the EITC targets low-wage
women, we can expect the relevant elasticities to be fairly high.
A series of recent studies use expansions of the EITC to identify supply elasticities.
These are reviewed by Eissa and Hoynes (2006a, 2008) and Hotz and Scholz (2003).
Studies of single women uniformly ﬁnd that the EITC unambiguously expands single
mothers’ labor market participation, consistent with a large extensive margin elasticity
(Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). Also consistent with this, Eissa
and Hoynes (2004) ﬁnd that the EITC reduces participation among married women. Hotz
and Scholz (2003) summarize the evidence as indicating an elasticity of women’s labor
force participation with respect to net-of-tax income between 0.69 and 1.16.
Another clear result is that eﬀects on hours worked conditional on participation are
comparatively small. Eissa and Hoynes (2006b) ﬁnd intensive-margin wage elasticities for
low skill married women of 0.07 and 0.44, depending on the speciﬁcation. These are if
anything larger than those obtained by others (e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996 and Meyer
and Rosenbaum, 2001). In a review, Meyer (2007) notes that the “lack of an ’hours eﬀect’
[of the EITC] is one of the more puzzling, yet robust ﬁndings in the literature.” Saez
(2002a) ﬁnds no evidence of bunching around the EITC kink points, again consistent
with a small intensive-margin elasticity.
Combining the two margins, it is clear that the net eﬀect of the EITC is to increase
single mothers’ total labor supply (Keane and Moﬃtt, 1998) and to reduce that of married
7Among single mothers who did not attend college, a group quite likely to receive the EITC, 68% work
full year and 56% full time. The source is the 1994 March Current Population Survey sample decribed
below.
8If the husband’s earnings are above C/τ1, the wife will face a non-negative MTR from her very ﬁrst
dollar of earnings. She also faces a positive ATR whenever the husband’s earnings are below p+ C/τ2 but
her potential earnings would place the family’s total income above p.
11women with children (Eissa and Hoynes, 2004).9 Eﬀects on the latter group tend to be
smaller than those on the former, suggesting that the net eﬀect on total labor supply
should be positive. But few studies examine the two groups in tandem.
Only a few studies have examined the wage impacts of the EITC. The between-group
contrast cannot identify these eﬀects if mothers with and without children participate
in the same labor markets. Thus, only weaker identiﬁcation strategies are available.
Rothstein (2008) compares the wage trends for workers with diﬀerent initial wages, who
plausibly participated in distinct labor markets, surrounding a large EITC expansion.
Allowing for a trend in the production function parameters (i.e., for skill biased techni-
cal change), he ﬁnds wage responses consistent with a demand elasticity of -0.3. Leigh
(2007) contrasts workers in diﬀerent states, under the assumption that labor markets are
geographic, and also estimates ρ = 0.3.10 Azmat (2006) studies the wage impacts of an
analogue to the EITC in the UK, but focuses on the eﬀect on the wages of recipients
relative to those of non-recipients in the same labor markets. In the competitive model
outlined above, this eﬀect is necessarily zero.
4 Data
I use data from the 1993 Annual Demographic Supplement to the Current Population
Survey (CPS) – the March survey – to simulate EITC eligibility and to calibrate the
impacts of the counterfactual policy changes discussed below. The 1993 data contain
information about labor market participation and annual earnings and wages from 1992.
This just predates the large EITC expansion that began in the 1993 tax year.
I form tax ﬁling units consisting of the family head and his or her spouse if present.
Following the EITC rules, the family’s credit is based on the number of resident children
under 18 or under 24 and enrolled in school.11 I compute hourly wages as the ratio of
annual earnings to annual hours. I exclude families where the woman’s hourly wage is
above $100 (in nominal dollars) or below $2, or where she has negative self employment
income.
Using the CPS sample, I simulate the EITC for which each family would have been
9The appendix discusses evidence regarding income eﬀects.
10Leigh computes this as the ratio of reduced-form eﬀects of the EITC on labor supply (of eligible and
ineligible workers combined) and wages. Leigh also interprets his results as indicating that all (or more
than all) of the EITC is shifted onto employers, however. This would imply inelastic demand (ρ = 0)
and no reduced form eﬀect on net labor supply of eligible women.
11In complex households, this only approximates the tax units used for EITC eligibility. For example,
I assign a child in a multigenerational household to her mother, when in fact she might be claimed on
her grandmother’s return.
12eligible in 1992 given its observed earnings.12 I use this to compute the marginal tax rate
(MTR) that each working woman faces and the average tax rate (ATR) on her earnings.
The latter is computed as the diﬀerence between the (negative of) the EITC credit due
to the family with and without her earnings, as a share of those earnings. Both MTRs
and ATRs incorporate only the federal EITC; I neglect payroll and income taxes as well
as state-level EITCs and other transfer programs.
Table 2 presents an empirical analysis of the distribution of women with children
across EITC segments. I divide women by marital status and, for married women, by
whether they worked at all during the year. About 30% of single mothers do not work.
Among those that do, slightly more are in the phase-out (positive MTR) region than in
the phase-in (negative MTR). In the subset without high school diplomas (Column 4) ,
the non-participation share is much higher, and a larger share are in the phase-in than
in the phase-out region. Among married couples, the majority have incomes too high to
receive the EITC. Those who are eligible are much more likely to be in the phase-out than
in the phase-in range, even when I limit attention to families where the women does not
have a high school diploma.13 The ﬁnal rows of the Table shows the fraction of working
women for whom the EITC induces a positive or negative ATR. All single women who
are eligible for the EITC face negative ATRs, but far more working married women face
positive than negative ATRs.
Figure 2 shows mean EITC marginal and average tax rates (hereafter, MTRs and
ATRs) among working women with children at each hourly wage, separately by marital
status.14 The average low-wage single mother faces a large, negative ATR. MTRs are
negative at the lowest wages and positive at wages between about $6 and $11. For
married women, average ATRs and MTRs are both positive but small throughout the
bottom of the wage distribution.
The model in Section 2 indicates that the EITC’s impact depends on the density of
EITC-aﬀected women in the labor markets in which they participate. Figure 3 shows
the fraction of working women at each hourly wage who are eligible for a positive EITC,
separately for single and married women. Throughout the bottom of the wage distribution,
12The EITC also depends on the family’s Adjusted Gross Income (AGI). I use Taxsim (Feenberg and
Coutts, 1993) to compute this, given the relevant variables that are available in the CPS. All further
calculations use my own EITC calculator.
13The distribution across segments is quite diﬀerent for married couples with and without female
earnings. When I calculate taxes without female earnings, however, the two groups’ distributions across
EITC segments are quite similar.
14These are computed by locally linear regressions of tax rates on the log hourly wage, separately for
married and single mothers. The regressions are weighted by annual hours worked; women with zero
annual hours are excluded. I use an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 0.05.
13the majority of single women are receive the EITC. The share of married women receiving
the credit is lower and drops oﬀ quickly at wages above about $5. Note, however, that
many married women who do not receive the EITC nevertheless face positive ATRs, as
the family would be eligible for a credit if they did not work.
5 Counterfactual policies
I contrast two counterfactual policy reforms, each treated as additions to the 1992 tax
schedule. The ﬁrst is a small proportional expansion of the EITC: A family whose credit
was c under the 1992 schedule would instead receive c(1 + ￿).15
I contrast this EITC expansion with a comparably-sized Negative Income Tax (NIT).
An NIT has only two parameters: A baseline credit CNIT and a rate τNIT at which it is
taxed away. A family with earned income y < CNIT/τNIT receives a credit of CNIT −yτNIT
and faces marginal tax rate τNIT; a family with income above this point gets nothing.
Importantly, families with zero labor income receive the full credit CNIT but are ineligible
for the EITC. An NIT produces positive MTRs and increases in virtual income for all
recipients. It also produces positive ATRs for all working single women, whether or not
they actually receive the NIT, and for any married woman whose husband earns less than
CNIT/τNIT. The NIT thus unambiguously reduces labor supply.
To make the two policies as comparable as possible, I limit my hypothetical NIT to
families with children. I set the ratio of CNIT for families with one child and with two
or more children to be the same as that for C under the 1992 EITC, and set τNIT so
that the NIT phases out entirely at the same income level as the EITC (i.e., so that
CNIT/τNIT = p + C/τ2) .
This still leaves the matter of setting the scale of the two policies. I report estimates
for an inﬁnitesimal EITC expansion that would add $1 to its total cost (computed over
the sample described in Section 4, excluding single fathers). All of the incidence formulas
in Section 2 are linear in the tax rate, so the extension to larger policies is straightforward.
In my simulations, over 40% of NIT spending goes to families with zero labor income,
so an NIT that spent the same amount as the EITC would have much smaller impacts
on the labor market. To permit a closer comparison, I calibrate CNIT so that the total
expenditures to families with positive earned income (using observed labor supply and
wages) is $1. An additional $0.79 goes to families without earned income.
15This hypothetical expansion diﬀers slightly from the large expansion that in fact took place between
1992 and 1996, which reduced the kink points somewhat, was proportionately more generous to two-child
families than to one-child families, and added a small credit for families without children.
14Figure 4 shows the tax schedules in the two proposed policies. Figure 5 shows the
change in mean tax rates that single and married mothers at each hourly wage would face
under each policy, assuming that labor supply and wages were unchanged. In each case, I
consider the proposed policies in isolation, and ignore the eﬀects of other taxes (including
the actual 1992 EITC). Figure 5 shows that the EITC expansion would reduce MTRs and
ATRs for low-skill single women, raise MTRs for single women at slightly higher wages,
and raise MTRs and ATRs slightly for married women. The NIT alternative would
increase MTRs and ATRs for all low-skill women, more so for those who are unmarried.
6 Calibration Methods
The equations in Section 2 provide simple expressions for the changes in the relevant
outcomes – participation rates, average hours among participants, and hourly wages – as
functions of changes in tax rates. My simulation of the impact of the two proposed tax
policies thus proceeds in three steps:
1. Specify the relevant labor markets.
2. Estimate changes in mean average and marginal tax rates within each market (and
for relevant subgroups), given observed distributions of labor supply and wages.
3. Compute labor market responses, given speciﬁed elasticities of supply and demand.
I discuss each step in turn.
6.1 Speciﬁcation of labor markets
In the model above, workers are separated into distinct labor markets. Hamermesh (1993)
discusses the aggregation of workers into discrete groups for analyses of labor demand.
He notes that the appropriate partition should yield cells within which workers are highly
substitutable. Most of the studies of the demand for heterogeneous labor that Hamer-
mesh (1993) reviews disaggregate workers by age, race, sex, or occupation. For the current
purposes, there is little harm in over-dividing. If workers in two cells are perfectly substi-
tutable, demand for workers in each cell will be highly elastic with respect to the wages
in that cell, holding other wages constant. The employer share of the tax burden would
be determined by the (less) elastic demand for workers in a super-cell that aggregates the
two perfect substitutes.
15Because the EITC primarily aﬀects women, I focus exclusively on the labor market
for women. I assume throughout that men and women participate in a distinct labor
market. In my primary analyses, I subdivide the female labor market by the intersection
of four education categories (less than high school, a high school diploma but no college,
some college but no degree, and college graduates), ﬁve-year age intervals, and marital
status. The ﬁrst two are conventional skill proxies (see, e.g., Borjas, 2003). The last is
motivated by Rothstein’s (2008) ﬁnding of substantial divergence between the wages of
similarly-skilled single and married women in the mid 1990s.
In sensitivity analyses, I consider several alternative categorizations. First, I consider
markets that are segmented by geography. I deﬁne geographic markets by state and,
within state, by whether the individual lives in a metropolitan area or not. I assume
that each geographic market is further divided by whether workers have some college (or
more) or not. Second, I use observed hourly wages as proxies for skill and assume that
workers compete only with other workers with similar hourly wages. This analysis uses
the continuous skill distribution discussed in Section 2.5. Finally, for each labor market
proxy, I explore separating or pooling the markets for single and married women.
6.2 Simulated tax rate changes
For each family in the CPS sample described above, I simulate eligibility for both of the
proposed tax credits. I use observed labor supply and wages for these simulations. In
computing tax rates, I treat married women as secondary earners. The average tax rate
that is relevant for their participation decisions is thus the diﬀerence between the family’s
after-tax income given observed labor supply and what the family would have were the
individual’s hours set to zero but non-labor income and husband’s earnings unchanged. I
then average across women in the same market to obtain mean marginal and average tax
rates. As discussed in Section 2, these averages are weighted by annual hours of work.
I treat all intensive margin responses as occurring along linear budget constraints
that coincide with the segment of the tax schedule on which the individual is observed.
Hausman (1985) emphasizes that some individuals will jump from one segment to another
in response to a tax change. An example would be someone who would reduce her hours,
lowering her total earnings from just above $22,370 to just below it, in order to qualify for
the proposed EITC or NIT. My strategy treats her MTR as zero, when in fact it would be
positive at her new labor supply. Three defenses can be oﬀered for my approach.16 First,
16The alternative would be to fully model the individual labor supply choice under the counterfactual
tax regimes. This would require assumptions about the full distribution of utility function parameters.
However, the utility speciﬁcations that have been used in the structural labor supply literature have a
16the evidence suggests that behavioral responses to nonlinearities in the tax schedule are
relatively small. Saez (2002a), for example, ﬁnds no evidence of bunching around convex
kinks in the tax schedule. Second, I analyze the incidence of a marginal change in the
tax schedule. Any behavioral responses are likely to produce only second-order eﬀects on
tax rates. Finally, the consequences for my analysis of mis-measuring any individual’s tax
rate are minor. The key rates are the means within relatively large cells, and these are
likely to be reasonably accurately proxied by my no-behavioral-response simulations.
6.3 Calibration of labor market responses
Given labor market deﬁnitions and estimates of the change in mean tax rates in each labor
market and subgroup, it is straightforward to apply equations (14) and (13) to obtain
the changes in labor market participation, hours conditional on participation, and wages
that the two proposed transfer programs would produce. I also assume that changes in
participation rates will not lead to changes in the mean wage of workers in the cell through
composition eﬀects (i.e. selection), and that any composition eﬀects on mean hours are
captured by the intensive margin elasticity. Finally, I assume that non-labor income,
family structure, and male earnings are invariant to the tax changes under consideration.
My baseline estimates assume that the elasticity of women’s participation with respect
to average wages is 0.75, that the elasticity of hours with respect to marginal wages
conditional on working is zero, and that the own-price elasticity of demand for labor
within each market is -0.3. Income eﬀects are assumed to be zero, though I present
speciﬁcation checks that allow for them.
The supply elasticities roughly correspond to consensus estimates in the literature
reviewed in Section 3. But the demand elasticity merits further discussion, as it is central
to the present analysis and much less is known about it. My parameter choice corresponds
to Hamermesh’s (1993; 1995) “best guess” at the elasticity of demand for homogeneous
labor; he suggests a plausible range of -0.15 and -0.75. Although one might expect the
demand for workers of particular types to be more elastic, the estimates that Hamermesh
reviews do not show clear evidence of this. Moreover, Hamermesh’s guess corresponds
closely to the estimates discussed in Section 3 that exploit EITC expansions.
By contrast, more recent estimates indicate a much wider range of possible values.
Generally, studies that exploit exogenous shifts in wages tend to ﬁnd small quantity re-
diﬃcult time explaining the common reduced-form result that extensive margin supply responses are
much larger than those on the intensive margin (Meyer, 2002). Absent better understanding of this issue,
it seems best to stick to the reduced form parameters without committing to a particular behavioral
model.
17sponses, consistent with inelastic demand, while those that exploit shocks to labor supply
(typically from immigration) ﬁnd small wage responses that indicate more elastic demand.
Thus, for example, the small-to-zero employment eﬀects of minimum wage increases found
by Card and Krueger (1995) would suggest quite inelastic demand for low skill labor (i.e.
ρ close to zero). And in a study of worker’s compensation insurance, Gruber and Krueger
(1991) estimate a demand elasticity of -0.5. By contrast, the immigration literature is
divided between estimates that immigration has essentially no eﬀect on native wages (e.g.,
Card, 1990), indicating ρ = ∞, and those that indicate small eﬀects that are consistent
with own-wage labor demand elasticities around 2.5 (Borjas, 2003; Borjas and Katz, 2007).
Card (2009) summarizes the immigration-based evidence as indicating that the elasticity
of substitution between high school graduates and college educated workers is between
1.5 and 2.5 and that high school dropouts are perfect substitutes for workers with high
school diplomas.
I have conducted extensive sensitivity analyses that vary the elasticity parameters. In
the results below, I present simulations that use extensive supply elasticities of 1, 0.75,
and 0.5; intensive elasticities of 0, 0.25, and 0.5; and demand elasticities of −∞, -1, -0.3,
and 0. Table 3 reports the reduced-form eﬀects of one percentage point across-the-board
increases in ATRs and MTRs on labor supply and wages for each parameter combination,
using equations (14) and (13). The baseline values are highlighted for emphasis.
7 Results
I begin by analyzing the case of perfectly elastic demand (ρ = ∞). This extreme case
helps make clear the direct labor supply eﬀects of the two proposed tax policies, as there
are no indirect eﬀects when the labor market can absorb arbitrary supply shocks without
changes in wages. Table 4 presents the simulated labor supply eﬀects, using extensive
margin supply elasticity σe = 0.75 and intensive margin elasticity σi = 0.17 Panel A
describes the proposed EITC expansion, while Panel B describes the NIT. All eﬀects are
characterized in terms of the total amount of additional (or reduced) earnings due to the
addition of the small hypothetical programs. Recall that each is calibrated so that the
total tax transfer to families with positive earnings is $1.
The ﬁrst two rows of each panel describe these tax transfers. By construction, all
EITC spending goes to families with positive earnings. In my simulation, 54 cents of
every dollar goes to single mothers, and 46 cents to married couples. The proposed NIT
17Note that the deﬁnition of labor markets is irrelevant with ρ = ∞, as there are no spillover eﬀects
from taxed to untaxed workers in any case.
18would give a slightly larger share of funds to single mothers. Much of the spending on the
NIT, however, goes to families without earned income. This amounts to $0.79 for every
$1 to families with labor income. Nearly three quarters of the funds given to non-workers
goes to female-headed households.
The next row presents the eﬀects on the labor market. By construction, the only
responses in this simulation are on the supply side at the extensive margin. My simulation
indicates that each dollar spent on the EITC leads to an extra $0.61 in earnings from new
unmarried participants and to $0.22 less in earnings from a net reduction in married
women’s participation, for a net increase in earnings of $0.39. The NIT, by contrast,
causes reductions in participation of both single and married mothers. Earnings fall by a
total of $1.11. There are no spillovers to women without children under either policy.
The ﬁnal row of each panel shows the change in after-tax income under each of the
proposed policies, combining the direct transfer with the change in earnings due to in-
creased or reduced labor market participation.18 The labor market eﬀects of the EITC
magnify the direct transfer to single mothers, so incomes rise by $1.16. Incomes of two-
adult families rise by only $0.23, as about half of the $0.45 in tax payments is oﬀset by
reduced earnings. Total after-tax incomes rise by $1.39. Under the NIT, the change in
total after-tax incomes is only $0.68, as much of the $1.79 that is spent on the program
is oﬀset by reduced earnings.
Table 4 clearly shows the EITC to be a more cost-eﬀective means of raising low-skilled
women’s incomes. This echoes the conclusions of many studies of the EITC. However, this
result turns out to be entirely dependent on the assumption that labor demand is perfectly
elastic and wages therefore exogenous. Table 5 presents my preferred simulations, using
the same supply parameters and somewhat inelastic demand (ρ = 0.3). Where Table 4
indicated that an EITC expansion would increase total earnings by $0.39 and those of
single mothers by $0.61, both operating entirely through labor supply responses, Table
5 indicates that total earnings would fall by $0.27. This reﬂects a small net increase in
labor supply (+$0.09) and a substantial (-$0.36) reduction coming from decreased wages.
Columns 2-5 describe the distribution of eﬀects across single mothers, single women
without children, married mothers, and married women without children. Single mothers’
labor supply rises by $0.35, a bit more than half as much as it did in the no-wage-response
model. Married mothers’ supply falls by $0.10. Recall that I model single and married
women as participating in distinct labor markets. Thus, wages fall in the single women
18With large policy shifts, there would be an interaction eﬀect as changes in labor supply behavior
lead to altered credit eligibility. Because I focus on extremely small policies and I neglect their eﬀects on
eligibility for other programs (including the actual 1992 EITC), the interactions are too small to show
up in the Table and the actual tax transfer equals, within rounding error, the intended transfer.
19markets and rise in the markets for married women’s labor. In each case, these wage
impacts are shared between mothers (who are eligible for the EITC or NIT) and ineligible
non-mothers. The wage impacts then lead to follow-on changes in labor supply among
non-mothers, partially oﬀsetting the eﬀects on mothers’ supply. Thus, while the labor
supply of single mothers rises substantially relative to that of non-mothers, the absolute
increase in single mothers’ supply is fairly small.
The ﬁnal rows of Panel A describe the total eﬀects on after-tax incomes and transfers.
For each dollar spent on the EITC, total after-tax incomes rise by only $0.73. This
reﬂects increases for single and married mothers that are slightly larger than the direct
tax transfers, and substantial declines for women without children. $0.64 of the $0.73
represents net changes in transfers. Beyond the direct tax transfers, there are large
transfers from single women to their employers and smaller transfers from employers to
married women. Both are divided between women with and without children; the net
transfer for unmarried women is -$0.18.
Panel B repeats the exercise for the NIT. The picture looks entirely diﬀerent. As in
Table 4, we see that $1 in spending on families with positive earnings is accompanied by
$0.79 for non-working families. This spending leads to small reductions in labor supply
(reducing earnings by $0.29) and large increases in wages (adding $0.98 to total earnings).
Thus, the net eﬀect is to increase after-tax income by $2.49, and the net transfer to workers
is even larger, $2.77. Even childless women receive positive transfers and see increases in
their wages and after-tax incomes.
The negative net eﬀect of the EITC on wages in Table 5 is driven by the large increase
in single women’s labor supply that the EITC induces with ﬁxed wages (as seen in Table
4). This occurs because the EITC produces negative ATRs for all low wage single moth-
ers. As I assume that the extensive margin is reasonably elastic but that labor supply on
the intensive margin – where many single mothers face positive tax rates – is completely
inelastic, the net eﬀect is necessarily positive. Although these supply parameters corre-
spond with what studies of the EITC’s labor supply eﬀects have found, it is nevertheless
worth exploring the possibility of an intensive margin response.
Table 6 presents the simulation for an intensive-margin supply elasticity of 0.25. Com-
pared with Table 5, the labor supply response to the EITC among single mothers is damp-
ened – an increase of $0.22 as compared with $0.35, despite a wage decline that is only
half as large. This reﬂects a participation response that is nearly identical to that seen in
Table 5, combined with an oﬀsetting but smaller hours response. The net eﬀect is to leave
single mothers’ earnings almost unchanged. However, single childless women’s earnings
fall substantially: The wage eﬀect remains non-trivial, and this has eﬀects on both exten-
20sive and intensive margin supply decisions. When we combine married and single women,
total earnings fall by $0.07. This is driven primarily by wage responses, with essentially
zero net supply eﬀect. After-tax incomes rise by $0.93, more than in Table 5 but still less
than the ﬁscal cost.
Allowing for intensive-margin supply responses has much less of an eﬀect on the evalu-
ation of the NIT (Panel B of Table 6). Here, ATRs and MTRs move in the same direction,
and the labor market eﬀects continue to produce a large multiplier for government spend-
ing.
7.1 Alternative Parameters and Deﬁnitions
Table 7 explores a variety of alternative elasticity parameters. To conserve space, for each
(σe, σi, ρ) combination I report only the net total transfer to all workers (Colums 1-4) and
to single mothers (Columns 5-8). The parameter combinations corresponding to Table 5
are highlighted for reference. Columns 1 and 5 show the case of perfectly elastic demand.
In this case, the economic transfer necessarily equals the statutory transfer. Comparing
these columns to the others indicates that with any of the other demand elasticities
a substantial portion of the intended EITC transfer to single mothers is captured by
employers. The ﬁrst nine rows of each panel vary the wage elasticities of labor supply,
maintaining the assumption that income eﬀects are zero. The last two rows ﬁx the wage
elasticities at 0.75 (extensive) and 0.25 (intensive) and allow for income eﬀects. The
method for doing so and the choice of parameter values are discussed in the appendix.
The magnitude of the transfer to employers is fairly insensitive to the particular de-
mand parameter, but is more sensitive to the supply elasticities. When the intensive-
margin supply elasticity is 0.5 (or when income eﬀects are large), the decline in labor
supply among married mothers creates a large transfer from employers to married women
that more than oﬀsets the transfer from single women to their employers. Even when
σi = 0.25, the net transfer to employers is reasonably small. However, the columns that
focus on single mothers show a less positive story. Under all of the parameter combina-
tions that I consider, employers capture at least 7% and sometimes as much as 80% of
the intended transfer to single mothers.
Panel B of the Table shows corresponding simulations of the NIT. Under all 33 pa-
rameter combinations that do not involve perfectly elastic demand, there are large net
transfers from employers to both single and married women, magnifying the direct ef-
fects of the tax credits. The size of these transfers is somewhat sensitive to the demand
elasticity but quite insensitive to the choice of supply parameters.
21Table 8 explores alternative partitions of the female workforce into labor markets,
using my baseline parameters (σe = 0.75, σi = 0, ρ = 0.3, no income eﬀects). I report the
net total transfer and the change in after-tax income, both for all women and for single
mothers. The ﬁrst row of each panel repeats the estimates from the baseline simulation in
Table 5. The second row considers the case where labor markets are deﬁned by geography
interacted with education (using a binary college-or-not classiﬁcation). This has only small
eﬀects on the estimates, for the EITC producing better outcomes for single women and
worse outcomes for married women. The third row returns to skill-based labor markets,
using the continuous skill distribution discussed in Section 2.5. This makes the EITC look
somewhat more attractive, primarily due to changes in married women’s outcomes.
In my baseline model and in the ﬁrst rows of Table 8, I assume that single and
married women participate in distinct labor markets. This assumption is not theoretically
motivated. In the second set of estimates in each Panel of Table 8, I assume that married
and single women compete for the same jobs. This has essentially no eﬀect on the outcomes
for all women, but dramatically improves the impact of the EITC on single mothers.
Recall that the labor supply eﬀects of the EITC are of opposite sign for married and
single women. Thus, the merging of the two labor markets dampens the net change
in labor supply and therefore the downward change in single women’s wages. The NIT
results are less sensitive to the assumption about labor market deﬁnitions, in part because
the labor supply of single and married women responds in the same direction.
Taking the results in Tables 7 and 8 together, I conclude that the labor market impacts
of the two proposed policies are moderately sensitive to reasonable variations in the labor
supply parameters and much less dependent on the particular labor market deﬁnition
used. They are quite insensitive to the demand elasticity within plausible ranges. The
general conclusion of the earlier analysis, that the superiority of the EITC over the NIT
is not robust to loosening the implicit assumption of perfectly elastic labor demand, does
not appear to depend on the particular modeling choices made there.
7.2 Distributional impacts
Of course, neither the EITC nor the NIT is intended to transfer money to mothers as
a class; both are intended as income support policies for low-wage families with chil-
dren. Thus, part of the evaluation of the policies must depend on their distributional
eﬀects within demographic groups. Table 9 explores the distributional impact of the two
proposed programs using the baseline elasticity parameters.
In Panel A, the estimates use my baseline marital status-education-age market deﬁ-
22nitions and show impacts across the four education categories. For each cell, I show the
intended tax transfer under each policy and the actual transfer (including wage eﬀects)
as a share of this, separately for married and single women. The total transfer under the
EITC, as seen earlier, is about two thirds of what was intended, and single women receive
less than half of the intended transfer. Statutory transfers under each policy are heavily
tilted toward women with below-average education. Under the EITC, “leakage” through
reduced wages is largest for the middle education cells, while in the highest and lowest
education groups a larger share of the tax transfer sticks with the intended recipients.
By contrast, under the NIT all four education groups receive a follow-on transfer from
employers that magniﬁes the tax credit. The ratio of this follow-on transfer to the original
credit is strictly increasing in education.
In Panel B, I return to the continuous skill deﬁnition, based on the hourly wage. This
makes it possible to examine the eﬀects of the two policies on each decile of the wage
distribution. Both policies are targeted at the lower end of the distribution, with about
70% of the credits paid to working women (90% for working single women) going to those
in the bottom half of the wage distribution. Under the EITC, only about two thirds of
the intended transfers to low-wage women stick there, while the small tax transfers to the
highest deciles (mostly going to single women with low annual hours) are accompanied by
relatively large wage increases. A similar pattern appears for the NIT: Though even the
lowest deciles obtain larger transfers than were intended, the magnifying eﬀect of these
follow-on transfers is much larger in the higher-wage categories. Under each policy, the
upper-decile wage eﬀects are concentrated among married women. Even relatively high-
wage married women may face positive ATRs (see Figure 4), and the resulting reduction
in their labor supply leads to wage increases in this submarket.
8 Discussion
Analyses of tax and transfer policy, both theoretical and empirical, have tended to ignore
the potential eﬀects of these policies on wage rates. The implicit assumption has been that
the entire economic incidence of taxes is on workers. Although some empirical analyses
(e.g., Gruber, 1997; Anderson and Meyer, 2000) ﬁnd evidence of this, others (Anderson
and Meyer, 1997; Kubik, 2004; Leigh, 2007) suggest that employers are likely to bear a
portion of the tax burden as well.
The neglect of incidence considerations is defensible in some contexts. But when
tax policy is used explicitly as a tool to manage labor supply incentives, as with the
EITC, the issue can no longer be ignored. This paper has shown that under reasonable
23demand elasticities substantial portions of the funds expended on the EITC are shifted to
employers, with negative consequences both for EITC recipients and for ineligible workers
in the same labor markets. Although the exact magnitudes of these eﬀects are sensitive
to parameter values, their presence and qualitative importance is quite robust.
Many discussions of tax policy have concluded that the EITC resembles the optimal
tax schedule or that it is a cost-eﬀective mechanism for raising the incomes of low-skill
workers with children. All of these are based on ﬁxed-wage analyses in which the results
generally turn on the substantial positive eﬀects of the the EITC on labor supply. Allowing
wages to adjust substantially weakens the case for the EITC. With reasonable parameter
values the net eﬀect of the program on the earnings of single mothers is negligible, as
declines in wages oﬀset increases in hours. Feasible alternative policies, including the
NIT, are much more eﬀective.
There are several limitations to the analysis undertaken here. In addition to those
mentioned earlier, three are worth highlighting as potential directions for future work.
First, I have assumed that labor supply elasticities are constant across female workers of
diﬀerent types. It would be straightforward to extend the formulas in Section 2 to allow for
heterogeneity in labor supply behavior. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) estimate a wage elasticity
of participation for married women that is much smaller than those typically obtained for
single women. With uniform elasticities, the EITC’s negative eﬀect on married women’s
labor supply partially oﬀsets its positive eﬀect on that of single mothers. If in fact married
women are less responsive than are single women, this oﬀsetting eﬀect is overstated, and
the EITC’s net wage eﬀects are even more negative than those presented above.
Second, I have ignored the interaction between my proposed EITC and NIT policies
and other preexisting distortions to the low-skill labor market. These would aﬀect the
welfare results: By treating my proposed policies as the only taxes I have been able to
ignore deadweight losses as second-order, where in fact the EITC might yield ﬁrst-order
reductions in deadweight loss produced by other work-discouraging programs. Interac-
tions between the EITC and other programs might also have ﬁrst-order eﬀects on the
government budget. But my results on after-tax incomes would not be aﬀected by the
inclusion of other programs in the simulation.
Finally, it would be interesting to examine the impact of incidence eﬀects on the design
of optimal transfers. The results here indicate that labor-supply-increasing schedules are
less desirable than one might otherwise expect. A plausible consequence is that the
optimal tax should have higher (less negative) tax rates at low incomes. This would be a
fruitful topic for future research.
24A Appendix: Incidence with Income Eﬀects
The speciﬁcations in Section 2.4 assume that income eﬀects are zero. In this appendix, I
derive formulas for the incidence of tax increases when income eﬀects are non-zero.
I begin by deﬁning two behavioral elasticities corresponding to income eﬀects on the
extensive and intensive margin. Let r be non-labor income (including husband’s earnings,
which are treated as exogenous) less the taxes that would be owed on this income if the
woman did not work. Let v be virtual income, the intercept of the linear segment of
the budget constraint on which a family with a working woman lies. These are related
by v = r + wL(MTR − ATR), where L = ph is the woman’s labor supply, wL is her
earnings, MTR is the marginal tax rate, and ATR is the average tax rate on the woman’s
earnings. Thus,
(15)
dvsg = drsg + wshsg (MTRsg − ATRsg)(dlnws + dlnhsg) + wshsg (dMTRsg − dATRsg).
A common deﬁnition of the income elasticity of labor supply is η ≡ NY
L ∗ ∂L
∂v, whereNY
is net-of-tax total income (including earnings; NY ≡ v+wL(1 − MTR) = r+wL(1 − ATR)).
Conventionally, the second fraction is the derivative of labor supply with respect to vir-
tual income but the ﬁrst uses net income instead. A natural extension of this to allow




∂r and the elasticity of hours conditional on participation as ηi ≡ NY
h ∗ ∂h
∂v.
Note that although these are deﬁned with respect to diﬀerent income concepts, a $1
increase in the family’s exogenous income raises r and v by the same amount.
A drawback to these deﬁnitions is that non-labor and virtual income need not be
positive. For example, single mothers in the phase-in segment of the EITC are likely
to have quite low non-labor income (and for this group v = r). Small changes in tax
parameters can therefore induce enormous changes in lnr and lnv, if indeed these are














I assume that these quasi-elasticities are constant across the population and compute
them from the chosen elasticities by using the mean of NY among working women in my
sample.
Given these deﬁnitions, we can write equations for the change in hours and participa-
tion at the (s, g) level as :
dlnhsg = σidlnws − σidMTRsg + ˜ ηidvsg (17)
and
(18) dlnpsg = σedlnws + σedlnhsg − σedATRsg + ˜ ηedrsg.
Substituting (16) into (17) and solving for dlnhsg, we can relate the change in hours to
the change in wages and the various tax parameters. We can then use this to obtain a
25similar expression for total labor supply:









I do not spell out the deﬁnitions of the ψ coeﬃcients. They are algebraically complex,
but their derivation from (16), (17), and (18) is straightforward.
In terms of these coeﬃcients, the change in supply at the level of the smarket is


















In the case with no income eﬀects, the ψ coeﬃcients do not themselves vary across indi-
viduals or groups, so they can be factored out of the summation. With income eﬀects, this
no longer the case: The ψ coeﬃcients depend on, for example, wshsg (MTRsg − ATRsg)













sg dMTRsg + ψATR
sg dATRsg
￿
, the averages of the relevant
composite expressions across g groups, weighted by hours supplied. (20) then becomes
(21) dlnLs = ψ
w
s dlnws + dτ.
The demand equation (suppressing nuisance parameters) is dlnLs = ρdlnws. Combining
this with (21), we obtain the reduced-form expression for the change in wages:




This can then be substituted in to (17), (18), and (19) to obtain reduced-form expressions
for the change in labor supply.
The only remaining issue is the choice of elasticity parameters. In two papers on the
eﬀects of the EITC on the labor supply of married couples, Eissa and Hoynes (2004, 2006b)
report separate estimates of the income eﬀects on participation and hours conditional
on participation. Eissa and Hoynes (2004) estimate a probit regression of labor force
participation on the net-of-tax wage (40w(1 − ATR)) and net-of-tax non-labor income
(r, in $1,000s). The r marginal eﬀect is -0.001 (SE 0.0003), and Eissa and Hoynes report
an elasticity of -0.039. Eissa and Hoynes (2006b) regress hours among the employed on
the log of the net-of-tax wage (w(1 − MTR)) and virtual income (in $1,000s). In one
speciﬁcation, they get a virtual income coﬃcient of -3.0 (SE 0.74); in another, they get
-25.3 (14.8). These correspond to income elasticities of -0.04 and -0.36.19 Given the
similarity of the Eissa and Hoynes estimates on the extensive and intensive margins, it is
quite plausible that the two income elasticities are the same. I present estimates for two
values: ηi = ηe = −0.04, corresponding to the lower set of estimates, and ηi = ηe = −0.36,
corresponding to the larger estimate of the hours response.
Other estimates in the literature are generally consistent with this range, with a bit
more support for the smaller (in magnitude) value. Imbens et al. (2001) use a sample of
lottery winners to identify the eﬀect of unearned income on labor supply. Their various
19In personal communication, Hilary Hoynes reports that these use the above deﬁnition of the income




26estimates of the elasticity of participation with respect to unearned income range between
-0.18 and +0.02. Imbens et al. do not report estimates of the elasticity of hours condi-
tional on participation, but do report that the unconditional hours elasticity is about 50%
larger than the participation elasticity. Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) survey the lit-
erature on female labor supply and summarize estimates of the “total income” elasticity
of labor supply, w∂L/∂r = wL/NYη, from studies that typically treat non-participation as
an econometric problem but not as a distinct decision margin. In my sample, the ratio of
the mean of wh to the mean of NY , both calculated over families with working women,
is about 0.5. A substantial majority of the estimates that Killingsworth and Heckman
report are between 0 and -0.18, consistent with the above range.
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Figure 2.  Mean EITC-associated average and marginal tax rates for women with 
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Notes:  Series are estimated via local linear regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel 
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Notes:  Series are estimated via local linear regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel 
and bandwidth = 0.05 log points.  
 













































Figure 5.  Mean marginal and average tax rates associated with proposed policies, 
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Notes:  Series are estimated via local linear regressions using an Epanechnikov kernel 
and bandwidth = 0.05 log points.  











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
N 7,005 13,139 5,221 1,760 1,261 1,355
% in each EITC segment, observed earnings
Zero earnings 30% 0% 11% 60% 0% 24%
Phase-in 19% 2% 7% 19% 8% 13%
Plateau 10% 2% 5% 8% 8% 11%
Phase-out 23% 10% 18% 11% 25% 26%
Earnings too high 18% 86% 59% 2% 60% 27%
Families with positive female earnings
% with ATR > 0 0% 26% 0% 44%
% with ATR < 0 75% 7% 94% 19%
All education levels Less than a high school diploma
Notes:  See text for sample description.  Only families with children are included in tabulations.  "ATR" 
= "Average Tax Rate," calculated on a working woman's earnings.
Single 
mothers

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:  Across-the-board 1pp increase in ATRs
Relatively inelastic extensive margin (σx = 0.5)
σi=0 -0.50% -- -0.33% +0.33% -0.19% +0.63% -- +1.00%
σi=0.25 -0.50% -- -0.27% +0.27% -0.13% +0.43% -- +0.57%
σi=0.5 -0.50% -- -0.22% +0.22% -0.10% +0.32% -- +0.40%
Central estimate of extensive margin elasticity (σx=0.75)
σi=0 -0.75% -- -0.43% +0.43% -0.21% +0.71% -- +1.00%
σi=0.25 -0.75% -- -0.34% +0.34% -0.15% +0.50% -- +0.63%
σi=0.5 -0.75% -- -0.29% +0.29% -0.12% +0.39% -- +0.46%
Unit elastic extensive margin (σx = 1)
σi=0 -1.00% -- -0.50% +0.50% -0.23% +0.77% -- +1.00%
σi=0.25 -1.00% -- -0.40% +0.40% -0.17% +0.56% -- +0.67%
σi=0.5 -1.00% -- -0.33% +0.33% -0.13% +0.43% -- +0.50%
Panel B:  Across-the-board 1pp increase in MTRs
Relatively inelastic extensive margin (σx = 0.5)
σi=0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
σi=0.25 -0.38% -- -0.20% +0.20% -0.10% +0.32% -- +0.43%
σi=0.5 -0.75% -- -0.33% +0.33% -0.15% +0.48% -- +0.60%
Central estimate of extensive margin elasticity (σx=0.75)
σi=0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
σi=0.25 -0.44% -- -0.20% +0.20% -0.09% +0.29% -- +0.37%
σi=0.5 -0.88% -- -0.33% +0.33% -0.14% +0.45% -- +0.54%
Unit elastic extensive margin (σx = 1)
σi=0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
σi=0.25 -0.50% -- -0.20% +0.20% -0.08% +0.28% -- +0.33%
σi=0.5 -1.00% -- -0.33% +0.33% -0.13% +0.43% -- +0.50%
Table 3.  Effects of uniform tax increases on labor supply and wages, by elasticities of supply 
(σ) and demand (ρ)
Notes:  Table shows the effect of a 1 percentage point in the ATR (panel A) or MTR (panel B) on all 
workers' earnings, using equations (13) and (14) in the text.  σx and σi are the elasticity of supply on the 
extensive and intensive margins, respectively.
ρ = ∞ρ  = 1 ρ = 0.3 ρ = 0w/ kids no kids w/ kids no kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:  EITC expansion
Intended tax transfer 1.00 $       0.55 $      - $      0.45 $         - $      
To families with earned income 1.00 $       0.55 $      - $      0.45 $         - $      
Change in labor supply (in $ of earnings) 0.39 $       0.61 $      - $      (0.22) $        - $      
Change in after-tax income 1.39 $       1.16 $      - $      0.23 $         - $      
Panel B:  NIT expansion
Intended tax transfer 1.79 $       1.20 $      - $      0.59 $         - $      
To families with earned income 1.00 $       0.59 $      - $      0.41 $         - $      
Change in labor supply (in $ of earnings) (1.11) $      (0.68) $     - $      (0.43) $        - $      
Change in after-tax income 0.68 $       0.52 $      - $      0.16 $         - $      
Notes:  Simulations are of an EITC or NIT expansion targeted at families with children and intended to 
transfer $1 to families with positive earnings (in the absence of labor supply or wage effects).  
Elasticities are σx=0.75, σi=0, ρ=∞.  Parentheses indicate negative numbers.
Single women Married women
Table 4.  Impacts of EITC and NIT Expansions without Incidence Effects (Perfectly Elastic 
Demand)
All 
womenTable 5.  Impacts of EITC and NIT Expansions with Incidence Effects (Demand Elasticity = -0.3)
w/ kids no kids w/ kids no kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:  EITC expansion
Intended tax transfer 1.00 $      0.55 $       - $        0.45 $     - $       
To families with earned income 1.00 $      0.55 $       - $        0.45 $     - $       
Labor market effects
Change in labor supply (in $ of earnings) 0.09 $      0.35 $       (0.20) $     (0.10) $    0.04 $     
Change in wages (in $ of earnings) (0.36) $     (0.31) $     (0.23) $     0.14 $     0.05 $     
Change in total earnings (0.27) $     0.03 $       (0.43) $     0.04 $     0.09 $     
Net effects
Change in after-tax income 0.73 $      0.58 $       (0.43) $     0.49 $     0.09 $     
Net total transfer 0.64 $      0.24 $       (0.23) $     0.59 $     0.05 $     
Panel B:  NIT expansion
Intended tax transfer 1.79 $      1.20 $       - $        0.59 $     - $       
To families with earned income 1.00 $      0.59 $       - $        0.41 $     - $       
Labor market effects
Change in labor supply (in $ of earnings) (0.29) $     (0.42) $     0.25 $      (0.21) $    0.10 $     
Change in wages (in $ of earnings) 0.98 $      0.32 $       0.30 $      0.26 $     0.11 $     
Change in total earnings 0.70 $      (0.10) $     0.54 $      0.04 $     0.21 $     
Net effects
Change in after-tax income 2.49 $      1.10 $       0.54 $      0.63 $     0.21 $     
Net total transfer 2.77 $      1.52 $       0.30 $      0.84 $     0.11 $     
Notes:  Simulations are of an EITC or NIT expansion targeted at families with children and intended to 
transfer $1 to families with positive earnings (in the absence of labor supply or wage effects).  Elasticities 
are σx=0.75, σi=0, ρ=0.3. Parentheses indicate negative numbers.
Single women Married women All 
womenTable 6.  Incidence Effects with Hours Responses (Intensive Margin Supply Elasticity = 0.25)
w/ kids no kids w/ kids no kids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A:  EITC expansion
Intended tax transfer - total 1.00 $       0.55 $       - $         0.45 $         - $        
To families with earned income 1.00 $       0.55 $       - $         0.45 $         - $        
Labor market effects
Change in labor supply 0.01 $       0.22 $       (0.14) $      (0.14) $        0.07 $      
Change in labor force participation 0.19 $       0.36 $       (0.11) $      (0.11) $        0.06 $      
Change in hours | participation (0.18) $      (0.14) $      (0.03) $      (0.02) $        0.02 $      
Change in wages (0.07) $      (0.17) $      (0.11) $      0.15 $         0.06 $      
Change in total earnings (0.07) $      0.05 $       (0.25) $      0.01 $         0.13 $      
Net effects
Change in after-tax income 0.93 $       0.60 $       (0.25) $      0.46 $         0.13 $      
Net total transfer 0.93 $       0.38 $       (0.11) $      0.60 $         0.06 $      
Panel B:  NIT expansion
Intended tax transfer - total 1.79 $       1.20 $       - $         0.59 $         - $        
To families with earned income 1.00 $       0.59 $       - $         0.41 $         - $        
Labor market effects
Change in labor supply (0.26) $      (0.54) $      0.38 $       (0.24) $        0.14 $      
Change in labor force participation (0.29) $      (0.47) $      0.30 $       (0.23) $        0.11 $      
Change in hours | participation 0.03 $       (0.07) $      0.08 $       (0.01) $        0.03 $      
Change in wages 0.95 $       0.32 $       0.29 $       0.23 $         0.10 $      
Change in total earnings 0.69 $       (0.22) $      0.67 $       (0.01) $        0.24 $      
Net effects
Change in after-tax income 2.48 $       0.98 $       0.67 $       0.58 $         0.24 $      
Net total transfer 2.74 $       1.52 $       0.29 $       0.82 $         0.10 $      
Notes:  Simulations are of an EITC or NIT expansion targeted at families with children and intended to 
transfer $1 to families with positive earnings (in the absence of labor supply or wage effects).  Elasticities 
are σx=0.75, σi=0.25, ρ=0.3. Parentheses indicate negative numbers.
Single women Married women All 
womenTable 7.  Sensitivity of total transfers to elasticity parameters
ρ = ∞ρ  = 1 ρ = 0.3 ρ = 0 ρ = ∞ρ  = 1 ρ = 0.3 ρ = 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:  EITC
Relatively inelastic extensive margin (σx = 0.5)
σi=0 1.00 $     0.83 0.69 0.50 0.55 $    0.40 0.27 0.11
σi=0.25 1.00 $     0.99 0.98 0.97 0.55 $    0.47 0.42 0.37
σi=0.5 1.00 $     1.09 1.13 1.16 0.55 $    0.51 0.49 0.48
Central estimate of extensive margin elasticity (σx=0.75)
σi=0 1.00 $     0.79 0.64 0.50 0.55 $    0.36 0.24 0.11
σi=0.25 1.00 $     0.95 0.93 0.91 0.55 $    0.43 0.38 0.34
σi=0.5 1.00 $     1.06 1.08 1.10 0.55 $    0.48 0.46 0.44
  Unit elastic extensive margin (σx = 1)
σi=0 1.00 $     0.75 0.62 0.50 0.55 $    0.33 0.21 0.11
σi=0.25 1.00 $     0.92 0.89 0.87 0.55 $    0.41 0.35 0.31
σi=0.5 1.00 $     1.04 1.05 1.05 0.55 $    0.46 0.43 0.42
With income effects (using σx = 0.75 and σi = 0.25)
ηe = ηi = -0.04 1.00 $     0.97 0.96 0.95 0.55 $    0.44 0.39 0.35
ηe = ηi = -0.36 1.00 $     1.17 1.25 1.31 0.55 $    0.51 0.49 0.48
Panel B: NIT
Relatively inelastic extensive margin (σx = 0.5)
σi=0 1.79 $     2.25 2.65 3.16 1.20 $    1.35 1.48 1.65
σi=0.25 1.79 $     2.33 2.65 2.95 1.20 $    1.39 1.50 1.60
σi=0.5 1.79 $     2.39 2.66 2.87 1.20 $    1.41 1.51 1.58
Central estimate of extensive margin elasticity (σx=0.75)
σi=0 1.79 $     2.38 2.77 3.16 1.20 $    1.39 1.52 1.65
σi=0.25 1.79 $     2.44 2.74 2.98 1.20 $    1.42 1.52 1.61
σi=0.5 1.79 $     2.47 2.72 2.90 1.20 $    1.44 1.53 1.59
  Unit elastic extensive margin (σx = 1)
σi=0 1.79 $     2.48 2.85 3.16 1.20 $    1.42 1.54 1.65
σi=0.25 1.79 $     2.51 2.80 3.00 1.20 $    1.45 1.54 1.61
σi=0.5 1.79 $     2.54 2.77 2.92 1.20 $    1.46 1.54 1.59
With income effects (using σx = 0.75 and σi = 0.25)
ηe = ηi = -0.04 1.79 $     2.47 2.79 3.04 1.20 $    1.43 1.54 1.63
ηe = ηi = -0.36 1.79 $     2.71 3.15 3.50 1.20 $    1.53 1.68 1.81
Note:  Highlighted cells correspond to elasticity parameters used in Table 5.






(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A.  EITC
Markets segmented by marital status
Education-experience 0.64 $         0.24 0.73 0.58
Geography-education 0.60 $         0.29 0.68 0.73
Wage (continuous) 0.78 $         0.34 0.84 0.59
Markets not segmented
Education-experience 0.64 $         0.46 0.73 0.99
Geography-education 0.57 $         0.48 0.63 1.08
Wage (continuous) 0.78 $         0.50 0.84 0.88
Panel B.  NIT
Markets segmented by marital status
Education-experience 2.77 $         1.52 2.49 1.10
Geography-education 2.81 $         1.46 2.54 0.99
Wage (continuous) 2.73 $         1.46 2.45 1.02
Markets not segmented
Education-experience 2.77 $         1.39 2.48 0.87
Geography-education 2.83 $         1.35 2.57 0.79
Wage (continuous) 2.73 $         1.35 2.45 0.83
Net total transfer Change in after-tax income
Notes:  Each row corresponds to a distinct definition of the relevant labor market.  Each 
simulation uses baseline elasticity parameters:  σx=0.75, σi=0, ρ=0.3.Table 9.  Distribution of net transfers with baseline parameters
Intended Actual 
(as % of 
intended)
Intended Actual Intended Actual  Intended Actual 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Baseline market definitions
Full population 1.000 $    64% 0.550 $     43% 1.790 $    155% 1.201 $    126%
By education
Less than high school 0.244 $    76% 0.090 $     48% 0.633 $    116% 0.407 $    108%
High school 0.431 $    64% 0.240 $     40% 0.671 $    157% 0.443 $    131%
Some college 0.260 $    51% 0.180 $     40% 0.392 $    181% 0.292 $    139%
College graduate 0.065 $    74% 0.041 $     60% 0.095 $    290% 0.060 $    159%
Panel B: Continuous skill distribution
Full population 1.000 $    78% 0.550 $     62% 1.790 $    152% 1.201 $    122%
By education
Less than high school 0.244 $    80% 0.090 $     64% 0.633 $    113% 0.407 $    106%
High school 0.431 $    78% 0.240 $     61% 0.671 $    150% 0.443 $    123%
Some college 0.260 $    75% 0.180 $     62% 0.392 $    170% 0.292 $    131%
College graduate 0.065 $    80% 0.041 $     60% 0.095 $    357% 0.060 $    168%
By hourly wage decile
Non-workers 0.207 $    100% - $        -        0.983 $    100% 0.615 $    100%
1st decile (bottom) 0.171 $    67% 0.091 $     58% 0.244 $    122% 0.170 $    110%
2nd decile 0.167 $    63% 0.110 $     60% 0.176 $    144% 0.125 $    118%
3rd decile 0.151 $    64% 0.110 $     60% 0.132 $    168% 0.097 $    129%
4th decile 0.138 $    61% 0.112 $     62% 0.105 $    215% 0.082 $    149%
5th decile 0.074 $    68% 0.063 $     65% 0.060 $    257% 0.049 $    166%
6th decile 0.045 $    86% 0.034 $     68% 0.041 $    364% 0.030 $    194%
7th decile 0.016 $    151% 0.011 $     58% 0.016 $    786% 0.011 $    368%
8th decile 0.013 $    186% 0.009 $     76% 0.013 $    847% 0.008 $    377%
9th decile 0.009 $    219% 0.005 $     78% 0.011 $    990% 0.007 $    411%
10th decile (top) 0.009 $    195% 0.005 $     77% 0.011 $    894% 0.006 $    359%
Notes:  Simulations use baseline elasticity parameters:  σx=0.75, σi=0, ρ=0.3.
EITC NIT
Single mothers All women Single mothers All women